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Abstract
Communities typically capture homophily as people of the same community
share many common features. This paper is motivated by the problem of com-
munity detection in social networks, as it can help improve our understanding of
the network topology and the spread of information. Given the selfish nature of
humans to align with like-minded people, we employ game theoretic models and
algorithms to detect communities in this paper. Specifically, we employ coordina-
tion games to represent interactions between individuals in a social network. We
represent the problem of community detection as a graph coordination game. We
provide a novel and scalable two phased approach to compute an accurate overlap-
ping community structure in the given network. We evaluate our algorithm against
the best existing methods for community detection and show that our algorithm
improves significantly on benchmark networks (real and synthetic) with respect to
standard normalised mutual information measure.
1 Introduction
In a social network, community structure is important as it helps in understanding the
spread of information, rumor, fashion, or a video in that network. Future popularity
of a meme can be predicted by quantifying its early spreading pattern in terms of its
community concentration. For example, the more communities a meme permeates,
the more viral it is. Thus, information about community structure gives predictive
knowledge about what information will spread widely [26]. Understanding the com-
munity structure of metabolic or biological networks can help in identifying the cure
for complex diseases [10]. In large protein-protein interaction data sets, protein-protein
interactions enable proteins to act concertedly to carry out their functions. Community
structure on protein interaction networks should show potentially good candidates for
the modules of proteins responsible for such functions.
In real-world networks, each vertex is likely to be a part of more than one commu-
nity. For example, in social networks like Facebook, Google+, there can be overlap in
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user’s high-school friends’ circle and his university friends’ circle. Similarly, in a col-
laboration network, a researcher can be a part of two different collaboration groups due
to varied research interests and due to his different affiliations. In a biological network
on genes, a gene can be responsible for more than one disease. So, it is common to
observe overlap in the community structures of several real world networks.
Most of the existing overlapping community detection algorithms fall into the fol-
lowing categories: (a) inference based approach [7] (b) label propagation [9], [29] (c)
information theory [5] (d) game theory based algorithms [4], [2] (e) clique percola-
tion methods [22]. The clique percolation algorithms like [22] are not scalable to large
graphs. Gopalan et al [7] has shown that the random walk approach [5] did not detect
the overlapping community structure accurately compared to the other algorithms con-
sidered in this paper. The inference based approach [7] and label propagation based
methods [9], [29] are scalable and are quite fast for large networks, but are not as effi-
cient in detecting overlapping communities as our algorithm, as shown in this paper on
several different networks. Hoefer et al [11] proposed max-agree games, as a kind of
clustering games which are similar to the graph coordination games considered in this
paper. Max-agree games differ from our games such that it benefits the players to play
different strategies whenever they are not connected.
There are a few game theory based overlapping community detection algorithms
in the literature, and they are not scalable for large networks. The algorithm by Chen
et al [4] uses game theory and tries to optimize a personalized modularity function
in every step using local search and its worst case running time is O(m2) (m is the
number of edges) time for unweighted graphs. It has been shown by Xie et al [27]
that this game theory based algorithm in [4] does not detect overlapping community
structures accurately compared to the other existing algorithms. Bei et al [2] uses a trial
and error approach along with coordination games from game theory to detect disjoint
communities in a given network and is not scalable and not efficient compared to our
algorithm. Similarly, Narayanam et al [19] used game theory to detect only disjoint
communities in a network and the algorithm is also not scalable. Though our algorithm
solves coordination games to detect the overlapping community structure, it is scalable
to large networks and is run on 500,000 vertex networks for varying parameters. It is
also found to be efficient over all the above stated algorithms on several networks for
varying parameters.
In this paper, we provide a novel, scalable two-phase algorithm to compute the
overlapping community structure of a network. We evaluate the algorithm NashOver-
lap against the current state of the art and we find that our algorithm works far better
than the best existing methods on the standard LFR benchmark networks, generated
by varying all the parameters. Our algorithm is also run on small and large real world
graphs like karate, dolphin and computer science bibliography database. Normalized
Mutual Information is used to evaluate the quality of detected community structures
against the ground-truth. Our algorithm is also evaluated against the current state of
the art of the disjoint community detection algorithms and we found its performance to
be as good as the other algorithms. It is the first game theory based overlapping com-
munity detection algorithm which does not optimize the modularity function and can
still detect an accurate community structure for a given social network. Though our
algorithm solves coordination games, it is scalable to large networks unlike the other
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game theoretic based algorithms.
2 Background
Weighted potential games were first introduced by Monderer and Shapley in their
landmark paper [18]. A game with a finite number of strategic players say n is a
weighted potential game if it admits a weighted potential function.
Let V be the set of all players. Let Si be the set of strategies of player i and the
utility function of player i is ui : S 7→ R where S = S1 × S2 × . . . × Sn. S−i is
the set of all possible strategies of all players other than player i. In a strategy profile
s = (si, s−i), si is a strategy of player i and s−i constitutes a strategy profile of all
the players other than player i. Let w = (wi)i∈V be a vector of positive real numbers
called weights. A function Φ : S 7→ R is a weighted potential function if for every
i ∈ V , and for every s−i ∈ S−i, and for every si, s′i ∈ Si,
Φ(s′i, s−i)− Φ(si, s−i) = wi · (ui(s′i, s−i)− ui(si, s−i)) (1)
A strategy profile is called a (pure) Nash Equilibrium (local optima) if no player i
can improve his utility by unilaterally changing his own strategy (i.e., adopting another
strategy). Every weighted potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium [18].
Coordination games are a class of games in which players have to choose the same
strategies in order to maximize their utility. Typically, a coordination game can have
multiple strategy assignments to all the vertices which are pure strategy Nash equilibria.
A strategy-assignment is Pareto-efficient, if there exists no other strategy assign-
ment in which a player can improve its utility without making other player’s utility
worse. Pareto-efficient assignment is a Nash equilibrium which is favored by all the
players, referred to as focal point by Thomas Schelling. However, every coordination
game is not guaranteed to have a pareto-efficient strategy assignment.
A local search problem is defined by
• a set of problem instances Π
• for every problem instance I ∈ Π
– a set F (I) of feasible solutions
– a value function (also called as potential function) Φ : F (I) 7→ R that
maps every feasible solution S ∈ F (I) to some value Φ(S).
– for every feasible solution S ∈ F (I), a neighborhood N(S, I) ⊆ F (I) of
S.
Neighborhood N(S, I) of a problem I is defined as all feasible solutions obtained
when only one player is allowed to change its strategy. To solve a local search problem
is to find a feasible solution S ⊂ F (I) that is a local optimum, i.e., Φ(S) ≤ Φ(S′) for
every S′ ∈ N(S, I).
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The problem of solving a coordination game (which is also a potential game) is
equivalent to the problem of solving an equivalent local search problem [12]. It means,
the set of Nash equilibria of coordination game is the same as the set of local optima
for the local search optimization problem.
3 Community Detection Problem
In a social networkG = (V,E,w), V is the set of vertices andE is the set of undirected
edges that represents relationships between vertices in the network and w : E 7→ R is
the weight function on edges. If the graph is unweighted, we assume that each edge
has unit weight. A community in a social network is a non-empty connected subset of
vertices with denser connections within themselves than with the rest of the network.
Formally, if Ci ⊆ V denotes a community i, then our goal is to identify the community
structure Γ = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}, where
⋃
i Ci = V .
3.1 Community Detection as a Graph Coordination game
As indicated earlier, people have selfish motives and prefer to align with like-minded
people and hence choose the same strategies as that of their closely bonded friends.
According to Schelling segregation model [25], these micro-motives of people to bond
with people of similar interests and choose strategies accordingly leads to a macro-
behavior emerging in the network, in the form of a community structure. Therefore,
to account for selfish motives of people to align with the like-minded, we represent
the problem of identifying community structure as a game where the set of actions
available to a player is the set of all communities.
We consider a game for each set of connected players. Each player has the set of
all communities in the network as its set of strategies. The utility for each player, when
they play the same strategy (choose the same community) as that of his neighbor in
the coordination game, is proportional to their tie-strength [8] (formally defined later)
and the utility when they play different strategies is zero. Extending on this utility
definition, the utility of a player playing the same strategy as that of a subset of his
friends (neighbors in graph) is proportional to the sum of his tie-strengths with each of
them. This is a graph coordination game.
4 Approach
We design a novel and scalable approximation approach in two phases to compute a
community structure of the network by solving for a particular Nash equilibrium of the
formulated graph coordination game.
In the first phase, we solve k graph coordination games independently by formu-
lating the local search version ζ1 of each game in the following way. Each vertex has a
set S of r strategies. Assign a strategy picked uniformly from set S of r strategies for
each vertex v ∈ V . Pick a uniform random ordering of vertices and each vertex gets its
turn to maximize its utility according to this ordering. In its turn, the vertex i picks the
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strategy si ∈ S, whichever gives the maximum utility. This is repeated with the same
ordering of vertices until no vertex can increase its utility by changing its strategy.
We prove that this graph coordination game ζ1 is a potential game. Any Nash
equilibrium of a r-strategy coordination game results in at most r communities. The
local optimum of ζ1 of any two independent games depends on the vertex-ordering
chosen and the initialization of the strategies to the vertices. For uniform initialization
of strategies to vertices and any vertex ordering in ζ1, we have already seen that when
the network has a clear community structure, its local optimum detects the community
structure with a high probability.
To deal with the networks whose community structure is fuzzy, we compute the
proportion of k games in which an edge chooses the same strategy to estimate their
probability of choosing the same community.
From these k games, we compute the edge-closeness value for each edge (i.e.,
probability that an edge can be in the same community) and an intermediate partition of
the network formed by considering only edges with a reasonably high edge-closeness
value. So, we consider the edges with edge-closeness value > 0.95, as the edges which
are most probably the community-edges (edges with both its vertices in a community).
Using these edges, we construct the set of all the connected components and call it
as intermediate partition. So, the connected components in the intermediate partition
correspond to the communities in which all the pairs follow the same strategy, in almost
all the games.
In the intermediate partition, the cut-edges are the edges where the vertices are in
different communities and community-edges are the edges where both vertices are in
the same community. Since, we identify an edge as community-edge only if it survives
as a community-edge in more than 95% of the graph coordination games in the first
phase, an actual cut-edge is more likely to be identified as a cut-edge in the intermediate
partition. However, an actual community-edge can be mistakenly identified as a cut-
edge, depending upon the fuzziness of the network. So, using the intermediate partition
and edge-closeness values computed in the first phase, the second phase takes care
of such mistakenly identified edges and outputs an accurate and stable overlapping
community structure.
We show that the problem of computing the local optimum for all these games
is NP-Hard using the ideas from [12]. However, we can allow for minor changes in
the game parameters and show that we can compute a stable overlapping community
structure in linear time (linear in number of edges).
The overall algorithm, referred to as NashOverlap is best illustrated in two phases
as shown in the Figure 1.
4.1 First Phase
In this phase, we identify edge-closeness values and an intermediate partition of the
graph using the concept of tie-strength. The concept of tie-strength was first introduced
by Granovetter in his landmark paper [8] and their hypothesis is that stronger the tie-
strength between two people, the larger their number of common friends and their
weights. Using that hypothesis, we define the tie-strength of any pair of friends in our
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Figure 1: Algorithm: NashOverlap
model which measures how tightly the pair is bonded to each other. Specifically, tie-
strength t(i, j) is the sum of the weights due to all common friends k of i and j plus
the edge weight w(i, j). Given a weighted network G(V,E,w), tie-strength t(i, j) of
an edge (i, j) is defined as:
t(i, j) = w(i, j) +
∑
k:(i,k)∈E
(k,j)∈E
(w(i, k) + w(j, k)) . (2)
We can then define ti, which is the sum of the weights of i′s adjacent edges:
ti =
∑
j:(i,j)∈E
t(i, j) (3)
As t(i, j) measures the strength of bonding between i and j, we assume that utility
for both i and j due to each other is proportional to their tie-strength when they choose
the same strategy and their utility is 0 when they choose different strategies. This serves
as the utility matrix of a coordination game. Formally, let si ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r−1} denote
the strategy that player i chooses; then (si)i∈V defines a strategy profile of the game.
Let s−i denote the strategies of all the other players other than i. Utility of a player i
at a given strategy profile s = (si, s−i) is given by
ui(si, s−i) ∝
∑
j:(i,j)∈E
si=sj
t(i, j) (4)
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We have chosen 1ti as the proportionality constant for our experiments, assuming
that utility of a player depends only on his and his friends’ strategies. This forms a
strategic game ζ1 = (V, (Si)i∈V , (ui)i∈V ), where V is the set of players, S constitutes
the set of r (r ≥ 2)strategies for each player i and ui is the utility function for each
player i as defined in the equation (4). We now show that ζ1 is a potential game with
the potential function Φ1 : {0, 1, . . . , r}|V | 7→ R that is defined as:
Φ1 =
∑
(i,j)∈E\Ec
t(i, j),
where Ec is the set of cut-edges.
Theorem 1. Φ1 is a weighted potential function.
To ensure, we obtain edge closeness values, we solve k independent local search
problems, each with a different initialization. k is chosen to be 100 for all our exper-
iments and depends on the size of the set of strategies for each player. The more the
strategies for all the players, the lesser the value of k.
Definition 1. Edge-closeness value p(i, j) for edge (i, j) is the proportion of k games
in which every pair of friends (i, j) have chosen the same strategy.
These p(i, j) values are representative of the macro-behavior emerged due to the
micro-motives of each player to align with people having similar interests. Using the
edge-closeness values for all the edges, we compute an intermediate partition, which
is the set of connected components in the network considering only the edges whose
edge-closeness values is at least β (β is set to 0.95 for all experiments). p(i, j) values
can be less for an edge with a reasonably good tie-strength. The correlation of p(i, j)
and tie-strengths is discussed in the subsequent subsection.
4.2 Second Phase
This phase takes care of the mistakenly identified edges in the intermediate partition
of first phase and decides their communities appropriately using edge-closeness values
and outputs a final overlapping community structure. To measure the closeness of the
communities to each vertex appropriately, we extend the notion of edge-closeness and
define community-closeness of a vertex i to a community C, p(i, C) as follows:
Definition 2. Given a vertex i and a community C, define the community-closeness,
p(i, C) to be the sum of edge-closeness values between i and C. That is,
p(i, C) =
∑
j:(i,j)∈E
j∈C
p(i, j).
Intuitively, a vertex is said to be adjacent to a community, if it has any of its adjacent
vertices in that community. For a given overlapping community structure Γ, we shall
duplicate every vertex in each of its overlapping communities. Let Ci be the set of
communities of player i in a given overlapping community structure. So, we put a
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copy of vertex i in each of its communities C ∈ Ci. Define, the utility of the player i
as the sum of its community-closeness values to its communities.
Consider a game ζ2 = (V, (Si)i∈V , (ui)i∈V ) where Si is the set of all i′s adjacent
communities, ui is the sum of i′s community-closeness values to all its communities.
We show that this game is a potential game and compute a local optima. A trivial so-
lution to this game is where every vertex is a part of every community. However, that
solution which also happens to be the optimal solution to the game does not represent
the actual community structure and is not interesting. So, we compute the local op-
tima of this game which represents a stable community structure in the following way.
We also show that this local optima represents a community structure as long as the
network has less mixing factor [13].
Pick a random vertex ordering and each vertex in its turn, computes its community-
closeness to each of its adjacent communities. The vertex chooses to be a part of
those communities to which its community-closeness is at least α times its maximum
community-closeness, if its utility increases with its decision. α is a overlap parameter
and lies in [0, 1] and it is decreased to increase the overlap in the detected community
structure. If α = 1, the resulting community structure has no overlap. For the purpose
of solving the problem of disjoint community detection, we can set α = 1. For our
experiments on synthetic networks, the results at α = 0.5 are almost same as the best
results obtained at any α ∈ [0.3, 0.7].
The local optimum of this algorithm gives a stable overlapping community struc-
ture. This is because, for a network with a clear community structure, we get an in-
termediate partition which is a community structure without overlap. To deal with the
overlapping vertices, we assume that the vertices which are overlapping have their in-
ternal degree equally distributed among its communities. We choose the communities
for each vertex by computing their maximum community-closeness and allotting the
communities to which its community-closeness is at least α = 0.5 times its maximum
community-closeness. If a vertex is not overlapping, we suppose that all other com-
munities of that vertex are less than α times it maximum community-closeness for a
reasonably high α. However, if two communities have many inter-community edges,
that together the two communities look like a random graph, then the two communities
are returned as a single community.
Using the intermediate partition and edge-closeness values from the first phase and
using the above algorithm,
ζ2 is a potential game with potential function Φ2 : {C1, C2, . . . , C|V |} 7→ R that is
given by
Φ2 =
1
2
·
∑
i∈V
C∈Ci
p(i, C) (5)
Theorem 2. Φ2 is a weighted potential function.
Proof. When player k changes his communities from ζk to ζ ′k, let us say that the cover
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changes from Γ to Γ′. Then the difference in the potential function is as follows :
1
2
·

∑
i∈V
C∈Ci
Ci∈Γ′
p(i, C)−
∑
i∈V
C∈CiCi∈Γ
p(i, C)
 (6)
Note that p(i, C) = 0 for all C, which are not adjacent communities of player i. The
above expression is same as ∑
(i,j)∈E
C∈C′i∩C′j
(i,j)∈C
p(i, j)−
∑
(i,j)∈E
C∈Ci∩Cj
(i,j)∈C
p(i, j) (7)
where Ci and C′i denotes the set of communities of player i in the cover Γ and Γ′
respectively. When player k changes its communities, then only the k′s adjacent edges
(k, l) need to be taken into account.∑
l:(k,l)∈E
C∈C′k∩Cl
(k,l)∈C
p(k, l)−
∑
l:(k,l)∈E
C∈Ck∩Cl
(k,l)∈C
p(k, l) (8)
which is same as the ∑
C∈C′k
p(k,C)−
∑
C∈Ck
p(k,C) (9)
So, the above equation gives the difference in the utility of the player k when it changed
its set of communities from Ck to C′k, which is always positive. So, this defines a
weighted potential game and hence the game converges.
At equilibrium, we obtain a stable and accurate overlapping community structure
detected by our algorithm.
4.3 Discussion
One trivial equilibrium of this game that is also the optimal solution of the game is one
where all the players choose the same strategy. However, given the selfish nature of
individual nodes, this equilibrium is highly unlikely.
We show here that when a network has a clear community structure say Γ, with
c number of communities, then there exists a Nash equilibrium which represents the
community structure Γ of the network for the above game. We provide an approach to
solve the game for a local optimum which represents the community structure Γ with
high probability.
Assume that in Γ, there are few inter-community edges and each community in
the network is very dense such that it is assumed to be a complete graph. Each vertex
has the same set S of strategies and |S| = r. Assign a random assignment of say r
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strategies/colors/communities independently to all the vertices. In the initial assign-
ment of colors, each vertex gets a given color with a probability of 1/r. Then in each
of c communities, the distribution of vertices over r colors is uniform. So, every color
is equally likely to be present in each community and distribution of the number of
vertices over all colors in each community is uniform. According to a uniform random
vertex-ordering, allow vertices to make decisions on their strategies sequentially to in-
crease their utility. Allow the vertices to make decisions according to that ordering and
the vertex-ordering can be repeated until no vertex can increase its utility unilaterally.
In one-walk of vertex ordering, where vertices make decisions sequentially, con-
sider the sub-walk of vertices of a given community. Since there are almost no inter-
community edges, there is almost zero influence on the decisions of vertices in any
community due to the decisions made by vertices outside the community.
Theorem 3. Assume, the community is a complete graph. For any vertex ordering,
given such a community, the sequential decisions made by the vertices to maximize
their utility according to their ordering, always leads to the local optimum in which all
the vertices in the community gets a unique color.
Proof. Let the given community has f number of vertices. It is assumed as a complete
graph on f vertices. We prove that all the vertices in the community gets a unique color
by contradicting it. Suppose that the community has r′ colors at local optimum where
1 < r′ ≤ r. Let blue be the color of maximum number of vertices and red be the
second best (ties are broken arbitrarily if two colors have the same number of vertices).
Pick a red colored vertex. Since each vertex is connected to every other vertex, the
red colored vertex is connected to maximum number of blue vertices and hence should
have been colored blue at local optimum. So, it contradicts that the community has
more than one color in local optimum.
Given a color, the probability that all the vertices in a single community gets that
color is 1/r. The probability that two communities get the same color is 1/r. The
probability that all the communities gets unique colors is (
r
c)·c!
rc . As r  c, each
community gets a unique color with high probability. If each color represents the
community, the local optimum represents the community structure Γ.
Thus we can compute a community structure of the network using the above algo-
rithm for a network with a clear community structure and dense communities which
we assume as complete graph. We repeat this game for enough number of times say k
and compute the edge-closeness values for each edge. Edge-closeness value for each
edge is defined as the proportion of games such that an edge chooses the same com-
munity at equilibrium in any game. In this particular scenario when the network has
a clear community structure, the expected value of edge-closeness value is 1 for all
community-edges of the network and 1/r for all the cut-edges over all the k games.
The connected components considering the edges with edge-closeness value at least
0.95 represent the actual community structure Γ.
However, in reality, the actual communities are not always enough dense and the
network usually do not possess a very clear community structure. So, the actual edge-
closeness values for all the edges vary a bit from their expected values.
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Hence, our algorithm to detect the fuzzy and overlapping community structure is
formulated in two phases.
4.4 Algorithm Analysis
We compute the pearson correlation between the edge-closeness values and edge tie-
strengths. We find that there is a positive correlation between edge-closeness values
and edge tie-strengths in all the cases. However, the correlation is not linear and it
increases as the mixing factor increases as shown in the figures (2a) and (2c). At lesser
mixing factors, all the edge-closeness values are distributed around 0.5 and 1. It is
easy to differentiate between a cut-edge and a community-edge. As the mixing factor
increases, the fuzziness of the community structure increases. The community edges
are harder to detect when the network is fuzzy as their edge-closeness values spread far
away from 1. So, a community-edge is more likely to be identified as a cut-edge, with
increase in mixing factor, the edge-closeness value need not be more than 0.95 for a
community-edge when the network is fuzzy.
The distribution of edge-closeness values for varying mixing factors is also shown
in the figures (2b) and (2d). For lesser mixing factors, the number of cut-edges is very
less compared to that of the number of community edges. Also, the number of edges
with edge-closeness values lying between (0.55 and 0.95) is almost negligible. With
increase in the mixing factor, the number of cut-edges are almost same as the number
of community edges. However, the number of edges with edge-closeness value lying
between (0.55, 0.95), increases.
Theorem 4. The problem of computing the local optimum of the graph coordination
game formulated in our paper is NP-Hard.
However this game can be run faster by allowing only big-enough improvements
taking the ideas from [6] and [12].
Definition 3. An improvement in the potential function is a good-enough improvement
if a vertex changes its strategy only if the potential function increases by a factor of 2·n
for some  > 0 where n is the number of vertices.
The entire network is the globally optimal solution. So, the maximum value of the
potential function in the first phase is the sum of all the edge tie-strengths. We compute
the estimate of the local optimum obtained by our algorithm in the first phase using the
following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let s be a local optimum. Then if we allow only good-enough improve-
ments while solving the game, we get (2 + ) · Φ1(s) ≥W
Proof. Let ui be the utility of vertex i in any game in the first phase. At a local op-
timal strategy profile of vertices, let the partition be (A1, A2, . . . , Ar). Since only good
enough improvements are allowed, the following equations hold true ∀h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r},∑
i∈Ah
ui(s) ≥
∑
i∈Ah
(1− ui(s)− 2 ·  · Φ1(s)/n) (10)
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(a) Scatterplot for mu = 0.1 (b) Histogram for mu = 0.1
(c) Scatterplot for mu = 0.5
(d) Histogram for mu = 0.5
Figure 2: Scatterplots and distribution of edge-closeness values for 5000 vertex net-
work when r = 2
Adding the above r equations, we get the following
2 · Φ1(s) ≥ 2 · (W − Φ1(s))− 2 ·  · Φ1(s) (11)
where W =
∑
i ti.
We get,
Φ1(s) ≥ W
2 + 
(12)
Theorem 6. The greedy algorithm which accepts good-enough improvement termi-
nates in at most O(−1 · n · log(W )) rounds, where W = ∑i ti in the first phase and
terminates in at most O(−1 ·n · log(W )) rounds, where W =∑ p(i, j) in the second
phase.
Proof. Each improvement increases the objective function by at least a factor of (1 +

n ). Since (1+
1
x )
x ≥ 2 for any x ≥ 1, we see that (1+ n )(
n
 ) ≥ 2, and so the objective
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(a) Scatterplot for mu = 0.1
(b) Histogram for mu = 0.1
(c) Scatterplot for mu = 0.5 (d) Histogram for mu = 0.5
Figure 3: Scatterplots and distribution of edge-closeness values for 5000 vertex net-
work when r = 40
function increases by a factor of at least 2 every n flips. The weight cannot exceed W ,
and hence it can only be doubled at most logW times.
Note that, our algorithm does not work if the local search algorithm is modified
such that it always detects the global optimum in any of the two phases. However if the
network has no community structure, then our algorithmNashOverlap always detects
the global optimum and the entire network is detected as the community structure. That
is the reason, our algorithm cannot detect the community structures when the mixing
factor is greater than 0.5 or when the number of overlapping vertices increases to 50%
accurately.
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Algorithm 1 NashOverlap
G(V,E,w) is the input network
for v ∈ V do
Pick strategy sv in {1, 2, . . . , r} uniformly at random
end for
for each game do
Pick an ordering assignment of vertices say A
repeat
for v ∈ A do
Choose sv such that uv(sv, s−v) is maximum
end for
until partition is the same in two subsequent iterations
Update the edge-closeness values p(i, j) for all edges
end for
Compute intermediate partition such that p(i, j) > β
α is a overlap parameter to be tuned.
repeat
for v ∈ V do
Let ζv be set of v’s adjacent communities
for C ∈ ζv do
Compute the community-closeness pv(C).
end for
Compute maxC {pv(C)}
Let ζ′v = {C|pv(C) > α.maxC(pv(C))}
Assign ζ′v as v’s communities if uv(ζ′v)>uv(ζv)
end for
until Community structure is same in two subsequent iterations
return Return the overlapping community structure
5 Experiments
We first describe the set up for the experiments and then provide the results.
5.1 Setup
To study the performance of NashOverlap, we conducted extensive experiments on
LFR benchmark networks [14] whose ground truth community structure is already
known.
Given a community structure, mixing factor µ is the maximum fraction of degree
of each non-overlapping vertex, outside its community. For example, if the mixing
factor is 0.1, then any non-overlapping vertex in any given community in that com-
munity structure has at most 10% of its degree outside its community. Overlapping
membership omi is the number of communities of the vertex i. Let on be the number
of overlapping vertices in a given network and γ1 and γ2 be the exponents of power
law distributions for degree and community size respectively.
Two overlapping community structures are evaluated for their similarity using the
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om SLPA COPRA CFinder OSLOM Nash
2 0.97943 0.9985 0.87659 0.99469 0.999807
3 0.93156 0.99305 0.8495 0.97704 0.998647
4 0.88207 0.96666 0.84058 0.94059 0.995646
5 0.83685 0.90756 0.82456 0.90608 0.974573
6 0.80283 0.83821 0.79269 0.86573 0.946112
7 0.7672 0.77883 0.75958 0.82451 0.90833
8 0.72346 0.71594 0.73811 0.77809 0.86996
om SLPA COPRA CFinder OSLOM Nash
2 0.96908 0.99386 0.573 0.99145 0.98645
3 0.92113 0.96677 0.59233 0.95551 0.982377
4 0.86531 0.91272 0.6062 0.90197 0.960399
5 0.81523 0.83743 0.58491 0.8488 0.914377
6 0.76729 0.77201 0.6287 0.80385 0.861334
7 0.72642 0.70658 0.6152 0.75626 0.808351
8 0.67675 0.65799 0.59361 0.71198 0.769981
om SLPA COPRA CFinder OSLOM Nash
2 0.87444 0.95993 0.36046 0.97164 0.968639
3 0.79596 0.89308 0.3135 0.89679 0.94078
4 0.75394 0.80646 0.37866 0.82748 0.877891
5 0.692 0.74409 0.36277 0.76214 0.787768
6 0.65122 0.69011 0.32862 0.7129 0.727489
7 0.60913 0.64374 0.34251 0.66702 0.678984
8 0.56703 0.59485 0.34953 0.62428 0.63227
Table 1: Comparison of algorithms on 5000 vertex networks varying overlapping mem-
bership from 2 to 8 and community sizes in the range [20, 100] for µ = 0.1 and µ = 0.3
and µ = 0.5 respectively and on = 10%.
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standard measure, Normalized Mutual Information(NMI) [15]. The networks are gen-
erated by considering the following parameter values:
• µ : Mixing factor varied between 0.1 to 0.5 in steps of 0.1
• n : Network size in {1000, 5000, 10000, 100000, 500000}
• om : Overlapping membership in {2, 3, . . . , 7, 8}
• on : Overlapping vertices 10% of the network size (n)
• maxk : Maximum degree is 50 (√n for large n)
• k : Average degree is 20 (15 · om for large n)
• γ1 : Exponent of power law distribution for degree is 2
• γ2 : Exponent of power law community size distribution is 1
• minc, maxc : Community sizes are picked from [20, 50], or [20, 100] (for small n)
• minc, maxc : Community sizes in [200 · n/100, 500 · n/100] (for large network sizes)
We compared the performance of our algorithm against current best algorithms:
CFinder [22], oslom [17], copra [9], slpa [28], svinet [7], Infomap [5]. The recent
algorithms svinet [7], Infomap [5] did to perform very well on all the synthetic net-
works considered and hence are not included in our comparison results. All the results
are averaged over 10 different LFR benchmark graphs for each case. We evaluate the
performance of algorithm NashOverlap with that of other algorithms with respect to a
standard measure Normalized Mutual Information [15].
CFinder algorithm [22] is run for each of the values k = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and
the partition that returns the maximum NMI is picked. Svinet [7], Infomap [5] algo-
rithms are run with parameters set to default values. The results of svinet and Infomap
are not shown in the paper as the results are comparably bad to the algorithms con-
sidered in this paper. The paper by [27] has shown that the game-theoretic algorithm
in [4] do not detect the overlapping community structure accurately compared to the
other algorithms considered in this paper. We ran the comparison against only those
algorithms whose code is freely available in their respective author’s websites. We ran
SLPA algorithm [29] on each value of r = 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40,
0.45 for 10 times, which is a parameter which decides the number of times the algo-
rithm can be repeated to improve its accuracy. We ran the algorithm COPRA, for each
v ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, enabling the mo for 10 times, as suggested by its manual. OSLOM
is run with the parameter r set to 10 and the rest of the parameters are set to default
values. For the execution of NashOverlap, we change the parameter α from 0.30 to
0.70, in steps of 0.02 to detect the best overlapping community structure, for a given
network. We picked only the best result for α ∈ [0.3, 0.7], just like we did for the rest
of the algorithms. However, in our algorithm, NMI values do not differ by more than
0.1 when α = 0.5. 10 replications are performed for each initial condition. Our code
is freely available at the following site: https://github.com/radsine00/cd.
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om SLPA COPRA CFinder OSLOM Nash
2 0.94081 0.99046 0.98891 0.99709 0.988725
3 0.88409 0.97186 0.95648 0.97162 0.984701
4 0.83081 0.92413 0.90241 0.93037 0.963998
5 0.7814 0.85657 0.86218 0.8866 0.939689
6 0.72565 0.7807 0.82019 0.8421 0.905594
7 0.67505 0.69129 0.78472 0.79773 0.849367
8 0.624 0.64776 0.74429 0.75376 0.843787
om SLPA COPRA CFinder OSLOM Nash
2 0.94974 0.993 0.99807 0.99927 0.993333
3 0.90199 0.97662 0.99597 0.99347 0.998454
4 0.85202 0.93949 0.97434 0.96904 0.992285
5 0.81337 0.88667 0.93541 0.93427 0.969991
6 0.76999 0.81585 0.90114 0.89681 0.936879
7 0.72725 0.74869 0.86722 0.85517 0.933189
8 0.68238 0.67474 0.84138 0.81597 0.898582
om SLPA COPRA CFinder OSLOM Nash
2 0.87739 0.96534 0.74218 0.97932 0.96987
3 0.81609 0.91718 0.70824 0.92384 0.95785
4 0.74911 0.83426 0.70452 0.86404 0.898204
5 0.68484 0.73797 0.70125 0.80304 0.828384
6 0.63765 0.67824 0.67734 0.75269 0.773777
7 0.58215 0.62764 0.65471 0.70534 0.731957
8 0.52835 0.5773 0.60169 0.65807 0.698016
Table 2: Comparison of algorithms on 5000 vertex networks varying overlapping mem-
bership from 2 to 8 and community sizes in the range [20, 50] for µ = 0.1 and µ = 0.3
and µ = 0.5 respectively and on = 10%.
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network size 1000 5000 10000 100000 500000
running time 1 4 26 404 2402
Table 3: Comparison of the Running times (in seconds) of NashOverlap on bench-
mark networks for small communities, and on = 10% and fixing average, maximum
degree at 20 and 50 respectively and µ = 0.1 and om = 4
5.2 Results
Due to space constraints, we are unable to show all the experimental results. We pro-
vide results for a few settings that are representative of the comparison results observed
over all the parameter settings. As the community size increases in comparison to the
network size, the fuzziness increases. So, we chose to fix the network size and change
the community sizes and show that our algorithm can still detect the community struc-
ture accurately.
NashOverlap outperformed all the other algorithms with respect to the Normalised
Mutual Information (NMI) measure in most experimental settings. The improvement
provided increases with increase in the network size for a given community size. While
the performance of all the algorithms degrades with increase in overlapping member-
ship, we show that NashOverlap has greater values for NMI compared to the other
considered algorithms as shown in the Tables 1 and , 2.
The overlapping membership also increases with the decrease in overlap parameter
α. If α is one, then the algorithm NashOverlap detects a disjoint community structure,
even when the network has an overlapping community structure.
We run the algorithm with overlap parameter α = 1 on benchmark networks [16] to
evaluate disjoint community detection algorithms. We varied mixing factor from 0.1 to
0.5, and community sizes and its performance is found to be as good as the following
disjoint community detection algorithms, CFinder [22], Louvain [3], Infomap [24],
Infomod [23] for all the considered networks.
5.3 Running times
The number of rounds taken by any game for any network size in the first or the second
phase to converge to the nash equilibrium is approximately n ·k1 where k1 is a constant
and k1 ≤ 10 in all the considered networks. In each round, each vertex takes O(d)
time to compute its utility where d is its degree and choose the best strategy. Roughly,
the total time to compute the overlapping community structure using our algorithm is
max{O(k ·m), O(n · dmax · k1)}, where k is the number of games in the first phase
and dmax is the maximum degree of a vertex.
On a laptop with Intel core i7 processor of 2.2GHz, the algorithmNashOverlap is
run on various network sizes. Table 3 summarizes the running times of the algorithm.
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5.4 Real World Graphs
The algorithm is also run on real world graphs like karate(n=34), dolphin(n=115), foot-
ball(n=62), celegan-neural(n=297), jazz(n=198), email(n=1133), and netscience(n=1589).
The community structures detected by our algorithm have comparable modularity [20]
values to that of those detected by Louvain [3] algorithm, one of the best modularity
optimization algorithms till date.
The algorithm is also run on large real world networks like DBLP, computer science
bibliography database. We considered only the papers from 1966 to 2014 from around
69 premier conferences and formed a collaboration network of 120000 authors and
400000 papers. Weight of the edge between any two researchers in this collaboration
network is the number of papers that the two researchers have co-authored together.
We attempted to detect the collaboration groups in this weighted network using
our algorithm. The detected groups are manually checked for their accuracy and are
compared against the collaboration groups detected by COPRA and OSLOM .
Our algorithm detected a large collaboration group of size 38% of the network size.
The large collaboration group detected for each dataset has the researchers, mostly
based in United States, from almost all the fields, and the second largest collabora-
tion group is far smaller in size than the first. The diameter of the largest collaboration
group for the large dataset is 9 and the average path length which is the average distance
between any pair of researchers in the giant component for the large dataset is 5. Note
that, this is because the average number of intermediate researchers that connect any
pair of researchers in the giant component is quite less. This finding is in congruence
with the statement from the paper [21] which says that in all the collaboration networks
studied, they identified a giant component which is a considerable fraction of the net-
work size and the second group happened to be far smaller than the first. The existence
of a giant component and the subsequent smaller components is due to the percolating
regime characteristic of collaboration networks. When the network has a fewer edges,
there exist a large number of small connected clusters. With the increase in the number
of edges, most of these small clusters group to form a giant component, leaving behind
smaller clusters which join the giant component in the future with the increase in the
number of connections. This leads to a reasoning that the scientific collaboration net-
work is highly connected and there is a possibility of more interdisciplinary work in
the future which is a good sign for the development of science.
We observe that the communities formed using our algorithm are representative of
the research communities (identified based on the conferences attended). Each com-
munity detected represents the set of authors with major share of their papers pub-
lished only in specialized set of conferences. Roughly, in each community, around
90% authors have specialization in a single research area and most of the authors in
each community belong to same country/continent. We have detected several commu-
nities each of which represents the authors from data mining, multi-media, database
systems, theory of computing, cadence and automation, complexity, cryptography, ma-
chine learning, logic, artificial intelligence, computer vision, and algorithms and data
structures.
Some of the collaboration groups identified are as shown in the figures 4 and 5.
19
Figure 4: Computational geometry collaboration group
6 Future Research
In the near future, we intend to perform dynamic network analysis using the edge-
closeness values computed at the end of the first phase. This would entail avoiding the
recomputation of the community structure in a dynamic network and modify the edge-
closeness values for some deletions and additions of edges. Our algorithm can also be
extended to the directed graphs and bipartite graphs by means of small modifications to
the utility functions. However the algorithm is not yet run on the directed and bipartite
benchmarks for its evaluation. This forms another scope for future work.
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